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Abstract
Two of the most important Portuguese mathematicians of the late 18th century, José Anastácio da Cunha and
Francisco Garção Stockler, showed interest in the question of the principles of the calculus and wrote on that
subject. In spite of both being admirers of Newton and d’Alembert, only Stockler based the calculus on the concept
of limit; Cunha used his own definition of infinitesimal. Here, I present the fundamental concepts on which Cunha
and Stockler based their versions of the calculus and I argue that the main difference between them lies in different
notions of variable.
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Sumário
Dois dos mais importantes matemáticos portugueses do final do século XVIII, José Anastácio da Cunha e
Francisco Garção Stockler, demonstraram interesse pela questão dos Princípios do Cálculo e escreveram sobre
o assunto. Apesar de ambos serem admiradores de Newton e de d’Alembert, apenas Stockler baseou o Cálculo no
conceito de limite; Cunha usou a sua própria definição de infinitésimo. Aqui apresento os conceitos fundamentais
em que Cunha e Stockler basearam as suas versões do Cálculo e defendo que a grande diferença entre os dois
reside em diferentes noções de variável.
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1. The question about the principles of the calculus in Portugal
A major reformation of the University of Coimbra took place in 1772, as part of an attempt to
modernize Portugal and especially Portuguese education. In the renewed university there was, for the
E-mail address: jcd@math.uminho.pt.0315-0860/$ – see front matter  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0315-0860(03)00004-1
16 J.C. Domingues / Historia Mathematica 31 (2004) 15–33first time, a Faculty of Mathematics, where, also for the first time in Portugal, the differential and integral
calculus was taught.
The Statute for the University of Coimbra of 1772 (that is, the Statute that enforced the reformation)
included, oddly enough, the earliest reference in Portuguese to the principles or metaphysics of the
calculus.1 Containing very detailed instructions for teaching, it specifies that the teacher in charge of
the calculus should take much care in teaching its fundamental principles in a clear way and in showing
that it was rigorous. A comparison was to be made with elementary geometry, since
Point without magnitude, Line without width, Surface without depth are not real and absolute entities, but rather hypothetical ideas
[. . .] in the same way [as] infinitesimal variations and elements [. . .] Being manifest that to assume a Line to have no width is not
different from assuming it to have infinitely small width, except in the manner of representing the same idea.
o Ponto sem grandeza; a Linha sem largura; a Superficie sem profundidade; não são entidades reaes, e absolutas; mas sim idéas
hypotheticas [. . .] do mesmo modo [que] as Variações, e Elementos Infinitésimos [. . .] Sendo manifesto, que suppôr huma Linha
sem largura, ou com largura infinitamente pequena, não tem diversidade alguma, senão no modo de representar a mesma idéa.
[Universidade de Coimbra, 1772, Vol. 3, 178–179]
In the same way, the students should be convinced that the Leibnizian neglect of higher order
infinitesimals did not imply any lack of rigor.
The textbook adopted for the teaching of the calculus (also the first book on the calculus published
in Portugal) was the second volume of Elementos de Analyse, by Bezout [1774], the first volume
being dedicated to algebra. Étienne Bezout (1739–1783) was a French mathematician very popular as
a textbook writer. His Cours de Mathématiques, in six volumes, was originally written for the naval
school where he taught (“Gardes du pavillon et de la Marine”) and was not intended for aspiring
mathematicians; a good example of this is that in the section on geometry, he explicitly avoided the
words “axiom,” “theorem,” and “scholium.” Parts of it, including the two volumes on analysis, were
translated from the French to be used by the students of the newly founded Faculty of Mathematics of
Coimbra. Its approach was strictly Leibnizian: infinitely small and infinitely large quantities (of several
orders) were the main tools, the differential dx of x being infinitely smaller than x and ddx infinitely
smaller than dx. No other approach was mentioned.2
Of course this would not prevent Portuguese mathematicians from reading books published elsewhere,
especially France. They did, and apparently in the last decade of that century and in the first years of
the next one they were greatly interested in discussing the principles of the calculus. Writings on that
subject include four works by José Anastácio da Cunha, one by Anastácio Joaquim Rodrigues, and two
by Francisco Garção Stockler, upon which this paper is focused. A textbook on differential calculus
by Tristão Silveira, not very good but showing much concern for the principles, will be mentioned as
well because it shows confused influence from both Cunha and Stockler. An unpublished Memoir on the
Principles of the Differential Calculus (Memoria sobre os principios do Calculo Differencial) written
in 1806 by José Avelino de Castro will not be treated here because it has very little interest (as far as
we know, Castro was about 15 years old when he wrote this memoir, which might explain its naïveté).
1 I thank Dr. Leal Duarte for indicating this reference to me.
2 The only exception, if it may be counted as one, is one mention of the word “fluxion” as an alternative to “difference”
or “differential” (p. 10 in the 1801 edition). I have not found such a mention in the 1775 edition of Bezout [1764–1769].
Therefore, I believe it to be particular to the Portuguese translation. Universidade de Coimbra [1772, Vol. 3, 178] has a similar
single occurrence of the word “fluxion.”
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Analytiques (Theorica das Funções Analyticas) and Carnot’s Réflexions sur la Métaphysique du Calcul
Infinitésimal (Reflexões sobre a Metaphysica do Calculo Infinitesimal), both published in 1798. They will
not be treated here since they appeared after the most relevant of the Portuguese writings on the subject,
which obviously means they were not influential. Noticing that both original texts were published in 1797
is enough for us to realize how much the Portuguese mathematicians were trying to keep up with this
subject.
2. Anastácio da Cunha, Anastácio Joaquim Rodrigues, and Garção Stockler
2.1. José Anastácio da Cunha
The most important Portuguese mathematician in the 18th century is undoubtedly José Anastácio da
Cunha (1744–1787). Born in Lisbon to a humble family, he was educated by the Oratorian priests (a rival
order to the Jesuits), but he claimed to have learnt mathematics and physics by himself. He spent about
10 years in the army, where he acquired a reputation as a good mathematician, and was later a professor
at the newly founded Faculty of Mathematics of the University of Coimbra. This did not last, since he
was arrested by the Inquisition in 1778 for holding forbidden opinions and therefore expelled from the
university. His sentence was relatively light and he was released in 1781. He was then appointed as a
teacher of mathematics in a school for poor boys in Lisbon, the Casa Pia. He could then resume a book
he had been writing for several years and which was to be a kind of Elements for all mathematics [Cunha,
1790]. Its first chapters were published in 1782, but he did not live to see it published in full, since he
died on January 1 1787, aged 42.3
Concerning influences, we have evidence that Cunha was an admirer of Newton and d’Alembert, but
not of Euler. On a controversy between him and Monteiro da Rocha, director of the Mathematics Faculty
of Coimbra, Cunha wrote:
But in Coimbra c’est tout une autre chose Newton, d’Alembert, ne sont que de petits génies. Euler is the only god of Mathematics
and Monteiro is his prophet. [. . . Euler,] when perplexed between manifest truths and Algebra, which contradicts them, would close
his eyes and cry out as a faithful algebraist: Quidquid sit, calculo potius, quam judicio nostro, est fidendum! (Whatever the question,
we should rely on calculation, better than on our judgement!)
Mas em Coimbra c’est tout une autre chose Newton, d’Alembert, ne sont que de petits génies. Euler é o unico Deus da
Mathematica, e Monteiro o seu propheta. [. . . Euler] quando se via perplexo entre verdades manifestas, e a Algebra, que as contradiz,
fechava os olhos, e exclamava como fiel algebrista: Quidquid sit, calculo potius, quam judicio nostro, est fidendum! [Cunha, 1785,
367]
I believe, however, that we can find influences from Euler in Cunha, and that these are not negligible.
Among them is the concept of variable. Even if these two mathematicians had quite different concepts of
variable, I believe Cunha’s might have been suggested by Euler’s.
3 For accounts of José Anastácio da Cunha’s life see Queiró [1988, 38–39] in English, Youschkevitch [1973, 4–6] in French
and Queiré [1992, 1–4] in Portuguese. The volumes of proceedings [Carvalho et al., 1989; Ferraz et al., 1990] include both
valuable contributions and much bibliography on Cunha’s life and work. An edition of his literary work (he was also a poet),
with a biography, is being published [Cunha, 2001].
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Very little is known about Rodrigues’ life.4 He was born probably in the late 1760s and died in Lisbon
in 1818; he studied at Casa Pia (where Cunha was his teacher) and then at the Naval Academy; he was an
army officer, a teacher at the Royal Fortification Academy, and a correspondent member of the Academy
of Sciences of Lisbon; in the early 19th century he travelled through Europe with a diplomat, D. José Luís
de Sousa Botelho. His only publications were a review of Cunha [1811] and a reply to another review of
the same book that he thought was unfair [Rodrigues, 1811; 1813]. He left unpublished a Dissertation on
the true notions of Infinite and Infinitesimal, which we will see in Section 4.
2.3. Francisco Garção Stockler
Francisco de Borja Garção Stockler (1759–1829) belonged to the generation that followed Cunha’s.
Some similarities can be noticed between these two men: both were poets and, as mathematicians, both
admired Newton and d’Alembert. However, there are several important differences between their lives.
Stockler had a more formal education than Cunha could have had, studying mathematics at the Royal
Naval Academy (Academia Real da Marinha) and at the University of Coimbra. He descended from
German traders who had settled in Lisbon and was at a higher social and financial level than Cunha.
However, he did have some political problems, being accused of collaboration with the French invaders
of 1807 (which he always denied). When he died he was a supporter of the absolutist usurper D. Miguel.
From 1787 until the French invasions, Stockler was a very important Fellow of the Royal Academy of
Sciences of Lisbon. He contributed largely to the first two volumes of Memoirs of the Academy and was
for some time the Secretary of the Academy. He was also a historian of mathematics, publishing in 1819
the first history of mathematics in Portugal (also the first history of mathematics dedicated to one single
country).5
3. Variables in 18th century calculus
Nowadays we think of the calculus as based upon set theory; for example a function is a subset of a
Cartesian product A× B . And even when we adopt a looser vision we think of a function as something
that to each element a ∈A associates an element b ∈ B . It was not so in the 18th century, when the notion
of set did not exist and a function was a variable quantity: y was a function of x if their variations were
related in a certain way. Therefore, the concept of variable was a fundamental one for the calculus.
Moreover, for us a variable is just a letter representing an arbitrary element of a set. It was not so for
most of the mathematicians in the 18th century, who regarded variables as being quantities (not letters)
that vary, that change in magnitude. As examples, see Définition I in l’Hospital [1696, 1]:
We call variable quantities those that increase or decrease continuously; and to the contrary [we call] constant quantities those that
remain the same while the others change.
On appelle quantités variables celles qui augmentent ou diminuent continuellement; & au contraire quantités constantes celles
qui demeurent les mêmes pendant que les autres changent.
4 See Rodrigues’ entry in Editorial Enciclopédia [1935–1960].
5 For biographical information on Stockler, see Saraiva [1993] in English (especially on his historiographical activity), or
the entry “Vila da Praia (Barão da)” in Editorial Enciclopédia [1935–1960] and Teixeira [1890–1892, Vol. 38, pp. 268–271] in
Portuguese.
J.C. Domingues / Historia Mathematica 31 (2004) 15–33 19Or the entry “variable” in Diderot and d’Alembert [1751–1780]:
In Geometry, we call variable quantities those quantities that vary following any law. Such are the abscissae and the ordinates of
curves, their osculating radii, etc. They are called that way as opposite to constant quantities, which are those that never change, like
the diameter of a circle, the parameter of a parabola, etc. [. . .] Some authors, instead of using the expression variable quantities, say
fluents.
on appelle quantités variables, en Géométrie, les quantités qui varient suivant une loi quelconque. Telles sont les abscisses & les
ordonnés des courbes, leurs rayons osculateurs, &c. On les appelle ainsi par opposition aux quantités constantes, qui sont celles qui
ne changent point, comme le diamètre d’un cercle, le paramètre d’une parabole, &c. [. . .] Quelques auteurs, au-lieu se se servir de
l’expression de quantités variables, disent des fluentes.
Or yet [Lacroix, 1797, 82]:
Those quantities considered as changing in magnitude, or able to do so, are called variable, and the name constant is given to those
that always keep the same value during the course of the calculations.
Les quantités envisagées comme changeant de grandeur, ou pouvant en changer, sont appellées variables, et on donne le nom de
constantes à celles qui conservent toujours la même valeur dans le cours du calcul.
This dynamic concept of variable was dominant well into the 19th century (see Cleave [1979]). In fact,
it is very clear in Cauchy [1821, 4]:
We call variable quantity that which we regard as to take successively several values different from one another.
On nomme quantité variable celle que l’on considère comme devant recevoir successivement plusieurs valeurs différentes les
unes des autres.
One may think that this is just dynamic terminology, just a way of speaking, but in fact there is
a dynamic concept of variable, which has consequences, at least for those who held limits to be a basis
for the calculus. Whenever we meet a definition of limit, in the 18th or early 19th century, what we see
defined is limit of a variable, not of a function or a sequence, as we are used to nowadays (often, as in
the entry “limite” in Diderot and d’Alembert [1751–1780], the adjective variable was omitted, but then
the wording is even more general: limit of a quantity). For instance, once again from Cauchy [1821, 4]:
When the values successively attributed to the same variable indefinitely approach a fixed value, so that they end differing from it as
little as desired, this latter value is called the limit of all the others.
Lorsque les valeurs successivement attribuées à une même variable s’approchent indéfiniment d’une valeur fixe, de manière à finir
par en différer aussi peu que l’on voudra, cette dernière est appelée la limite de toutes les autres.
The fact that a variable could have a limit is essential to understand Cauchy’s analysis: a very important
tool for him was the concept of quantité infiniment petite, which was precisely a variable having limit
zero.
But it is also important to understand how any mathematician could use limits at the time. When we
say limx→a f (x)= b, we can interpret this as ∀ε > 0 ∃δ > 0: |x − a|< δ⇒ |f (x)− b|< ε. But there is
a different modern interpretation,6 generalizing the notion of sequence, that might clarify things a little
and which I will summarize here:
A partial order 
 on a set X is a direction if any two elements of X have an upper bound. A net is
a function from a directed set X into a topological set Y .
6 Due to E.H. Moore and H.L. Smith in the 1920’s. See Kelley [1955, Chap. 2].
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such that x 
 p⇒ f (x) ∈ V .
The usual order  is a direction on N; if (xn)n∈N is a real sequence, then we get precisely the usual
definition of limxn.
When we have f :R→R and a ∈R, to “find” limx→a f (x) we just direct R\{a} by x 
 y⇔ |x−a|
|y − a|. Then we have limf , meaning what we usually denote as limx→a f (x).
Directing R\{a} by x 
 y⇔ |x − a| |y − a| plays the same role as saying “x approaches a,” which
is what 18th century mathematicians would do. You need to order the values of the variable, or rather, to
direct the domain of the function, in order to choose one of the accumulation points of its range as the
limit.
The relevance of paying attention to the concept of variable involved when studying Cauchy’s calculus
has been noted at least in Cleave [1979] and Felscher [2000]. The latter describes Cauchy’s variable as
not a letter, but a mathematical concept, the concept of a form to be filled by assignments A of values [Felscher, 2000, 849]
and remarks that
The domains L of such assignments A remain unspecified; apparently they were supposed, at the very least, to be subject to an order
relation (so that one could speak of valeurs les unes après les autres). [Felscher, 2000, 850]
But one has to realize that the only way to order the values of the variable (or the “domain of the
assignment”) in the 18th and early 19th centuries, much before the language of set theory was available,
was to use such dynamic language as “approach.”7
However, some people might object to this language on the grounds that it implied involving a physical
concept, namely time. We will see that Anastácio Joaquim Rodrigues, Cunha’s pupil, argued so. So did
Stockler, in a sense, but he decided that involving time was inevitable and that it should not be regarded
as an exclusively physical concept.
Some people might also object to the vagueness and lack of rigor in ordering the values of x by such
phrasings as “x approaches a.” Maybe that was what Lagrange had in mind when, criticizing limits, he
wrote:
we cannot rigorously say that the subtangent is the limit of the subsecants, because nothing prevents the subsecant from yet increasing
when it has become the subtangent.
on ne peut pas dire à la rigueur que la sous-tangente soit la limite des sous-sécantes, parce que rien n’empêche la sous-sécante de
croître encore lorsqu’elle est devenue sous-tangente. [Lagrange, 1806, 2]
But the major exception to the dynamic concept of variable in the 18th century is to be found in Euler:
A variable quantity is an indeterminate or universal quantity, which comprises in itself absolutely all determinate values.8
Quantitas variabilis est quantitas indeterminata seu universalis, quae omnes omnino valores determinatos in se complectitur.
[Euler, 1748, 4]
7 Except for the special case of discrete variables. For these, the usual order of N was available. This might be one of the
reasons the concept of sequence became fundamental in analysis.
8 This translation is taken from Youschkevitch [1976, 61].
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this definition of variable with Cunha’s.
4. Cunha on variables and infinitesimals
4.1. Sources
José Anastácio da Cunha is known to have written three works exclusively about the principles of
the calculus, namely On the Mathematical Infinite (Sobre o Infinito Mathematico), Against the doctrine
of prime and ultimate ratios of nascent and evanescent quantities of Newton (Contra a doutrina das
razoens primeiras e ultimas das quantidades nascentes e fenescentes de Newton), and a Prologue on the
Principles of the fluxionary Calculus (Prologo sobre os Principios do Cálculo fluxionário). Unfortunately
these works were never printed and the manuscripts are lost. In fact we only know they existed because
of two references from one of his pupils, João Manuel de Abreu: one in the foreword to Cunha [1811]
and the other on a proposal for an edition of his master’s manuscripts (see Ferraz et al. [1990, 353–355
and 393]). We must therefore use parts of his other works to try and find out what were Anastácio da
Cunha’s ideas on this subject (of course, the title Against the doctrine of prime and ultimate ratios. . . is
in itself a good clue).
Our main source is the chapter dedicated to introduce the calculus in Cunha’s main work, his
Principios Mathematicos [Cunha, 1790]. Unfortunately, like most of the book, it lacks commentaries and
is desperately concise. The terseness of Cunha [1790] is in fact remarkable: in only 302 pages, Cunha tries
to summarize all the main branches of mathematics, from elementary geometry to differential equations
and finite differences, including convergent series9 and of course differential and integral calculus. All
is set as a sequence of definitions, axioms and propositions with the shortest proofs as possible; only
once in a while there is a scholium. The presentation is usually synthetical, rather than analytical—that
is, the results are stated and then proved to be true, rather than investigated.10 Although it was published
posthumously in 1790 in one volume, it should be said that its first “books” (that is, chapters) were
published starting in 1782 and constituted his only publication while alive. A French translation by a
pupil of Cunha, João Manuel de Abreu, was published in Bordeaux in 1811 [Cunha, 1811], but it is not
reliable (and it does not seem to have been much read).11
But we have another good source: a Dissertation on the true notions of Infinite and Infinitesimal
(Dissertaçaõ sobre as verdadeiras noçoens de Infinito, e Infinitessimo), by another of Cunha’s pupils,
Anastácio Joaquim Rodrigues; this work was discovered in manuscript form in 1998 and published for the
first time as an appendix to Domingues [1999]. Rodrigues claims, convincingly, to be following Cunha’s
9 This is one of most well-known parts of the book, and deservedly so: Cunha gives a definition for convergence of series
that corresponds to what we know as the Cauchy criterion (more than 30 years before Cauchy); then he uses it to prove the
convergence of the geometric series with decreasing terms and to define the power ab , from the start, as a series. For this, see
A.J.F. Oliveira [1988], Queiró [1988, 40–41], or Queiró [1992, 6–14].
10 On Cunha [1790] see, in English [Queiró, 1988], in French [Giusti, 1989], in Portuguese [Duarte and Silva, 1990;
J.T. Oliveira, 1989; Queiró, 1992].
11 It was this translation that Youschkevitch used for his paper [Youschkevitch, 1973]. A.J.F. Oliveira [1988] explains in detail
how the errors of translation led Youschkevitch into some misinterpretations regarding Cunha’s approach to infinite series.
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also referred to his master’s original view of the calculus in a short passage in his review of the French
translation of Cunha [1790], Rodrigues [1811, 401–402] and in his reply [Rodrigues, 1813, 437–443] to
a less favorable review [Playfair, 1812]. It is worth mentioning that we know a letter from Cunha where
he speaks of Rodrigues showing pride for his mathematical skills [Cunha, 1785, 360–361].
4.2. Variables
“Book XV” of Cunha [1790] is the chapter where Cunha introduces the differential and integral
calculus.12 It begins with the following Definition I:
If an expression can assume more than one value, while another can assume only one, the latter will be called constant, and the former
variable.
Se huma expressaõ admittir mais de hum valor, quando outra expressaõ admitte hum só, chamarse-ha esta constante, e aquella
variavel. [Cunha, 1790, 193]
In order to better understand this definition, certainly not typical of the 18th century,13 I think the
following footnote from Rodrigues’ Dissertaçaõ is helpful:
I will never consider variables as magnitudes that change in size, but as names or expressions representative of several magnitudes,
always the same and unchangeable [. . .] I will do so because I find it always unnecessary to complicate the idea of magnitudes,
mathematically considered, with the idea of time.
Naõ considerarei nunca as variaveis como grandezas, que variaõ de tamanho, mas sim como nomes ou expressoens reprezentativas
de muitas grandezas, sempre as mesmas e inalteraveis [. . .] faço-o assim porque acho escusado em todos os casos complicar a idea
das quantidades, mathematicamente consideradas, com a ideia de tempo. [Rodrigues, 1999, 116]
That is, Rodrigues, probably following Cunha’s ideas, thought that the usual concept of variable
invoked time, and that this was undesirable. Hence Cunha’s nondynamic definition of variable.
One should then try to compare Cunha’s definition with Euler’s, also a nondynamic one (see the end
of Section 3). There are obvious differences: first of all, Cunha’s variable is an expression, while Euler’s
is a quantity. Besides, Euler’s variable can take any value whatever. When Euler argues that a function is
also a variable, he says:
Thus, even though the function
√
9− z2 cannot take any value greater than 3 when we substitute real numbers for z, if we ascribe
imaginary numbers, like 5
√−1, to z, it is not possible to assign a determinate value that cannot be derived from the formula
√
9− z2.
Sic etsi haec Functio
√
9− zz, numeris realibus loco z substituendis, nunquam valorem ternario majorem recipere potest; tamen
ipsi z valores imaginarios tribuendo ut 5
√−1, nullus assignari poterit valor determinatus quin ex formula √9− zz elici queat. [Euler,
1748, 4–5]
Cunha’s variable, on the contrary, can take several values but possibly not every value (this is
fundamental to his definition of infinitesimal, as we will see below). Anachronistically speaking, it is as
12 On Cunha’s calculus, see, in English [Grattan-Guinness, 1990; Queiró, 1988], in French [Youschkevitch, 1973] (but see
footnote 11), and in Portuguese [Domingues, 1999, 33–67; Duarte and Silva, 1990; Queiró, 1992]. A.J.F. Oliveira [1990] is a
(failed, in my view) attempt to interpret it under the light of non-standard analysis.
13 Franco de Oliveira says this is the “modern, Fregean concept” of “variable as mere formal symbol” [A.J.F. Oliveira, 1990,
120].
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I will return to this anachronism in the next section.
Euler’s definition of variable seems, however, to be the closest we can get in the 18th century to
Cunha’s. It seems also close enough to have inspired it: one just has to wonder “what if we make z assume
only real values; and moreover, would then y =√9− z2 not be a variable?”
I am focusing on the last part of Euler’s definition, variable as comprising all the values. Ferraro [2000]
focuses on the first part, variable as indeterminate quantity or, as Ferraro says, abstract quantity:
A crucial aspect of the Eulerian conception is that a quantity was a variable insofar as one made the values and other specific
characteristics of this quantity abstract. [. . .] one considered only the way that [. . . a variable] combined with itself and the other
variables [. . . not] its specific content (which, apart from anything else, was identical for all the variables). [Ferraro, 2000, 109]
This is in sharp distinction to Cunha’s and Rodrigues’ conception: the “specific content” of a variable,
the values it can take, is of prime importance, as we will see when we turn to infinitesimals. However,
I am not studying Euler here. It is enough that his definition, or even just the phrasing of his definition,
might suggest to Cunha a different and quite original one.
4.3. Infinitesimals
We know that Cunha admired Newton and d’Alembert. But we also know that he wrote a text called
Against the doctrine of prime and ultimate ratios of nascent and evanescent quantities of Newton. Since
he did not agree with the “prime and ultimate ratios,” which inspired the usual notion of limit, and
moreover having such a static conception of variable, as we have seen, Cunha could not subscribe to
d’Alembert’s metaphysics of the calculus. And in fact we do not see such a notion as limit in Cunha
[1790].14
However, he certainly agreed with d’Alembert in rejecting the actual infinite:
It was redressing the absurd notion commonly held of infinite and of infinitely-small that M. da Cunha arrived at defining in a clear
and geometrical manner what should be understood by fluxion. Neither infinity, nor infinitely-small are quantities; since the notion of
quantity is inseparable from the notion of boundaries in every way [. . .]
C’est en redressant la notion absurde qu’on se faisait communément de l’infini et de l’infiniment-petit que M. da Cunha est parvenu
à definir d’une manière claire et géométrique ce qu’on doit entendre par fluxion. L’infini, ni l’infiniment-petit n’est pas une quantité;
car l’idée de celle-ci est inséparable de l’idée de bornes en tout sens [. . .] [Rodrigues, 1811, 401]
Without limits nor infinitely small quantities, on what could Cunha base his own version of the
differential calculus? The answer is, on a new conception of infinitesimal. Definition II of Book XV
of Cunha [1790] reads:
A variable always capable of assuming a value greater than any proposed magnitude will be called infinite; and a variable always
capable of assuming a value smaller than any proposed magnitude will be called infinitesimal.
A variavel que podér sempre admittir valor maior que qualquer grandeza que se proponha chamarse-ha infinita; e a variavel que
podér sempre admittir valor menor que qualquer grandeza que se proponha, chamarse-ha infinitessima. [Cunha, 1790, 193]
14 Cunha does use ultimate ratios, but in quite a different context, namely his Essay on the Principles of Mechanics [Cunha,
1807] in the definitions of velocity and acceleration; time, of course, could not and should not be excluded there.
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adjectives that may be applied only to variables.
Which variables could, then, be called infinitesimal? Returning to an anachronism I used in the
previous section, I would say that a variable x is infinitesimal if 0 is an accumulation point of the set
of values that x can take15—the set associated with x. This may sound too anachronistic, but notice how
Rodrigues puts it:
It is [easy] to form an idea of [. . .] Infinitesimal, which is that of a variable [. . .] smaller than any assignable quantity, that is a name
or expression common to many magnitudes, having the property that among them there is always one that is [. . .] smaller than any
proposed quantity [. . .]
[. . .] he [facil] formar idea de [. . .] Infinitessimo, que vem a ser de variavel [. . .] menor do que qualquer quantidade assinavel,
isto he, de nome ou expressaõ commum de muitas grandezas, com a propriedade de haver entre ellas alguma sempre [. . .] menor, que
qualquer quantidade proposta [. . .] [Rodrigues, 1999, 109]
Rodrigues would even give such a nonintuitive example as the following, of a variable both infinite
and infinitesimal:
Hence it follows that the same variable can be simultaneously infinite and infinitely small. Such is for example the ordinate of the
hyperbola, the angle of the asymptotes being that of the coordinates and one of them being the base.
De là il s’en suit qu’une même variable peut être infinie et infiniment petite en même tems. Telle est par exemple l’ordonnée de
l’hyperbole, l’angle des assymptotes étant celui des coordonnées et l’une d’elles la base. [Rodrigues, 1811, 401–402]
Of course, 0 and ∞ are both accumulation points of {1/x: x ∈ R}.16 I believe this example is proof
enough that Rodrigues (and probably Cunha as well) did not view “x is infinitesimal” as equivalent to
“the limit of x is 0” but as something closer to “0 is an accumulation point of x.”
However, we do not find in Cunha’s comment-free textbook a single example of an infinitesimal
variable. In fact, the plain use of Cunha’s infinitesimals in the manner of most Leibnizian mathematicians
would not be correct: assuming that x takes every real value (that is, associating x with R), x is
infinitesimal; but so is 1
x
(we might say, following Rodrigues, that 1
x
is both infinite and infinitesimal);
however, x + 1
x
is not an infinitesimal. What is then the use for a definition of infinitesimal that does not
preserve such a fundamental rule as “infinitesimal + infinitesimal = infinitesimal?” Well, Anastácio da
Cunha does not use isolated infinitesimals, individually associated with definite sets of values. Instead,
all his propositions involving infinitesimals have an implication form as
(1)“x being infinitesimal makes f (x) be infinitesimal”
(where f (x) is some expression involving x). It does not matter whether the set of values x takes is R,
R\{0}, { 1
n





15 One must bear in mind that, as usual at that time, Cunha meant by a < b what we mean by |a|< |b|, so that, for instance,
2 was smaller than −10.
16 Provided we accept ∞ as a point. Neither Cunha nor Rodrigues would, but then, neither spoke of accumulation points: the
point of my anachronism is only to give a modern characterization of Cunha’s infinitesimals, not to say that they thought in
those terms, of course.
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infinitesimal makes both f (x) and g(x) be infinitesimal, then x being infinitesimal makes f (x)+ g(x)
be infinitesimal. However, it should be remarked once again that none of these considerations is to be
found in Cunha [1790] (even discarding the fact that I presented them in such an anachronistic way).
The definition of infinitesimal is stated and then used without any commentary. The rules of infinitesimal
arithmetic are not even stated. It is only Rodrigues’ comments and especially his example on the ordinate
of the hyperbola quoted above that induce us to these considerations.
The purpose of defining infinitesimal is to help define fluxion (Cunha used the Newtonian words
“fluxion” and “fluent” for “differential” and “integral,” but the respective notations are Leibnizian), which
is done in Definition IV. Cunha uses Greek letters, usually Γ , for functions, so that he writes Γ x where
we would write f (x):
Some magnitude having been chosen, homogeneous to a root [that is, to the independent variable of some function] x, to be called
fluxion of that root, and denoted by dx; we will call fluxion of Γ x, and will denote by dΓ x, the magnitude that would make dΓ xdx be




infinitesimal or zero, if dx were infinitesimal, and all that is not dependent of dx were constant.
Escolhida qualquer grandeza, homogenea a huma raiz x, para se chamar fluxaõ dessa raiz, e denotada assim dx; chamarse-ha
fluxaõ de Γ x, e se denotará assim, dΓ x, a grandeza que faria dΓ x
dx




infinitessimo ou cifra, se dx
fosse infinitessimo, e constante tudo o que naõ depende de dx. [Cunha, 1790, 194]
Briefly, the standard interpretation of this passage, at least since [Youschkevitch, 1973], is that dΓ x is
a linear function of dx (since dΓ x
dx
is constant) such that
lim
dx→0
Γ (x + dx)− Γ (x)− dΓ x(dx)
dx
= 0,
which is, of course, the modern definition for the differential of Γ (provided we substitute some letter




instead of Γ (x+dx)−Γx−dΓ x
dx
with an emphasis on the constant dΓ x
dx
; could he have thought of it originally as the limit of Γ (x+dx)−Γx
dx
,
replacing the word “limit” later on?
Proposition I in book XV of Cunha [1790] shows a very clear use of Cunha’s concept of infinitesimal.
Cunha uses a perfect epsilon–delta argument:18
x being infinitesimal will make Ax +Bx2 +Cx3 +Dx4 +&c. infinitesimal, provided the coefficients A,B,C,D,&c. are constant.
Let n be the number of coefficients A,B,C,D,&c., and P any magnitude greater than each of them: let Q be any proposed










, and so forth; therefore n × 1nQ, that is
Q>Ax +Bx2 +Cx3 +Dx4 +&c.
x infinitessimo fará Ax +Bx2 +Cx3 +Dx4 +&c. infinitessimo, se os coefficientes A,B,C,D,&c. forem constantes.
Seja n o numero dos coefficientes A,B,C,D,&c., e P qualquer grandeza maior que cada hum deles: seja Q qualquer










, e assim por diante; e logo n × 1nQ, isto
he Q>Ax +Bx2 +Cx3 +Dx4 +&c. [Cunha, 1790, 194–195]
17 Mawhin [1990] gives the same interpretation as Youschkevitch, compares Cunha’s definition with Weierstrass’ definition
of differential, and presents some 19th and 20th century developments. Duarte and Silva [1990, 91], Grattan-Guinness [1990,
57], J.T. Oliveira [1989, 69] are not so enthusiastic, pointing to some limitations in Cunha’s definition compared to the modern
differential (while accepting its novelty at the time). Domingues [1999, 52–57] tries to analyze these limitations, claiming that
most were inevitable at the time, having to do with the lack of appropriate terminology. One limitation that does not have to do
with this, of course, is the fact that Cunha does not question the existence of fluxions for any function.
18 He had already used this kind of argument in Book IX, on convergent series (see footnote 9).
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reader establishes between (1) and (2): it probably makes him think that although Cunha did not use
the word “limit,” he did use the concept of limit. But we should be careful and ask, which concept
of limit? If we are thinking of the modern definition of limit, then the answer is yes, though he does
not use the word limit, he uses our “limit,” in the sense that the proof of Prop. I above is a proof of
limx→0(Ax +Bx2 +Cx3 +Dx4 +&c.)= 0. But of course that is not a very sound historical approach;
we should put him in his proper context. If we do so I believe we will see a mathematician who, in a very
conscious manner, rejected the contemporary concept of limit (that inspired by Newton and d’Alembert)
and along with it the limit-based view of the calculus.
5. Stockler on variables and limits
5.1. Sources
Stockler wrote two main texts on the principles of the calculus: a “Memoir on the true principles of
the Method of Fluxions” (“Memoria sobre os verdadeiros principios do Methodo das Fluxões,” [Stockler,
1797]) and a Textbook on Limit Theory (Compendio da Theorica dos Limites [Stockler, 1794]). Also quite
relevant is a 74-page Lettre à M. le Redacteur du Monthly Review [Stockler, 1800], where Stockler tries
to answer an unfavorable review that his “Memoir. . .” had received [Anonymous, 1799].19 These works
are quite different from Cunha’s and much less original. Like Cunha, Stockler admired Newton and
d’Alembert, but unlike Cunha, he was fully committed to a limit-based calculus.
The “Memoir. . .” was published in the first volume of the Memoirs of the Academy, that is, in 1797,
later than the Limit Theory, which had appeared in 1794; but it had been submitted to the Academy in
1787. Reading them, the order in which they were written is very clear. The way limits are handled in
the “Memoir. . .” is still very naïve, while the Limit Theory shows that in the meantime Stockler had read
l’Huilier’s Exposition [l’Huilier, 1786] and had reached as high a sophistication in working with limits
as one could expect at the time.
5.2. (Fluent) variables
In his “Memoir on the true principles of the Method of Fluxions,” Stockler clearly follows a Newtonian
standpoint, and coherently he does not define variable as such, but rather fluent variable:
I call Fluent any variable quantity which changes in magnitude continually and successively, that is, which increases or decreases by
a continual flow or progression, and which therefore cannot go from one state of magnitude to another without passing through every
intermediate state.
Chamo Fluente a toda a quantidade variavel, que muda de grandeza continua, e successivamente, isto he, que cresce, ou diminue
por um fluxo, ou progresso continuo, e que por consequencia naõ póde passar de hum para outro estado de grandeza sem passar por
todos os estados intermedios. [Stockler, 1797, 204]
19 For a detailed description of Stockler [1794], see Saraiva [2001]. On these three works by Stockler, see Domingues [1999,
70–98].
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and variedly fluent quantities, their different “tendencies” to flow, etc. Stockler substitutes tendency to
flow (in a rather vague manner) for velocities, in order, it seems, to avoid leaving geometry and entering
mechanics, which he thinks MacLaurin had done. Anticipating accusations of incoherence, he explains
that one must recognize that it is impossible to conceive any kind of succession without considering the
idea of time. The word Stockler uses, “sucessão,” would eventually become the Portuguese word for
sequence, but he certainly had a more general idea in mind (the word he uses in French is “succession,”
not “suite”). He seems just to regard the successive values of the variable as succeeding (= following)
one another through time.20
Stockler repeats these ideas when replying to Anonymous [1799].21 Among the faults the reviewer
finds in Stockler’s Memoir is his regarding quantities as generated by motion (a Newtonian “fault,” in
fact). Stockler replies that unlike Newton and MacLaurin, he had not considered motion:
The idea of motion, and the idea of velocity are too particular to be allowed in a General Theory of Fluent Quantities. We should
allow there only ideas common to every kind of quantity, and to every kind of change in magnitude, provided it is continuous.
L’idée de mouvement, et l’idée de velocité sont assez particulieres pour être admises dans une Théorie générale des Quantités
Fluentes. On n’y doit permetre que des idées communes a toute espece de quantité, et à toute espece de changement de grandeur,
pourvu qu’il soit continuel. [Stockler, 1800, 5]
His theory depended in fact upon ratios of time intervals, but that was not a fault, since
the idea of such a ratio is not a principle, or an element, particular to the Theory of motion, as has been supposed until now. The idea
of time is necessarily linked to the general idea of succession: the mind cannot conceive one without the other: and since quantities
called Fluent are precisely those, that change in magnitude continuously and successively, the idea of succession, and consequently
that of time, are essentially comprised within the idea of Fluent Quantity.
l’idée de ce rapport n’est pas un principe, ou un élément particulier à la Théorie du mouvement, comme on le supposoit jusqu’à
present. L’idée du temps a une liaison nécessaire avec l’idée générale de succession: l’esprit ne peut concevoir l’une sans l’autre: et
comme les quantités qu’on appelle Fluentes sont précisement celles, qui changent de grandeur continuellement et successivement,
l’idée de succession, et par conséquent celle du temps, sont essentiellement comprises dans l’idée de Quantité Fluente. [Stockler,
1800, 5]
Despite his claim to originality, Stockler is just being more direct than other mathematicians who
used limits (and most of the others, too, when asked to define variable). He probably would agree with
Rodrigues that the usual concept of variable required the notion of time; unlike Rodrigues, however, his
next step was not to reject the usual concept of variable, but rather to accept time as inevitable.
What is not so directly put is that Stockler regards fluent variables as monotonic: they either increase
or decrease, never oscillate. This is clear from his conclusion that the increments or decrements of any
fluents are proportional to the time intervals in which they flow [Stockler, 1797, 204]. This is possibly
due to the idea that all variables (or functions) are, if not monotonic, at least piecewise monotonic.
In his Limit Theory, Stockler no longer talks about fluent variables, rather just variables. And their
definition seems quite static:
20 Recall that Cauchy says that a variable quantity is one such that “on considère comme devant recevoir successivement
plusieurs valeurs différentes les unes des autres” [Cauchy, 1821, 4] (my emphasis).
21 Although [Anonymous, 1799] is anonymous, Grattan-Guinness believes it to be by Woodhouse [Grattan-Guinness, 1990,
60 and 62]. What is absolutely obvious is that the reviewer was Lagrangian.
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Todas as quantidades, cuja grandeza se considera como podendo admittir differentes valores, chamaõ-se variaveis. [Stockler,
1794, 1]
As we will see in the next section, it was not so: these variables were capable of increasing or
decreasing. In fact, they seem to possess the same characteristics as fluent variables, except for the
necessary continuity: the partial sum of a series is here allowed as a variable. If it were not for the
monotonicity restriction, they would be the same variables as Cauchy’s.
5.3. Limits
Stockler’s Textbook on Limit Theory [Stockler, 1794] is much different from the “Memoir on the true
principles of the Method of Fluxions.” While the latter is a somewhat confused discussion about fluxion
as tendency to change, the former is very sober, written in Euclidean style: definitions, theorems with
proofs, and a few scholia. At the beginning, after defining constant quantity as one in which one does not
admit any change in value, and variable quantity as we have seen above, Stockler defines limit:
A constant quantity is called limit of a variable, when the latter can increase or decrease in such a way that, though its value never
being able to equal the former’s value, it can however approach it so much that their difference eventually becomes less than any
quantity one has assigned, no matter how small.
Huma quantidade constante chama-se limite de huma variavel, quando esta póde crescer, ou diminuir de tal sorte, que ainda que
o seu valor naõ possa nunca ser igual ao valor d’aquella, possa com tudo aproximar-se tanto a elle, que a sua differença venha a ser
menor que qualquer quantidade, que se tenha assignado, por quaõ pequena esta seja. [Stockler, 1794, 1–2]
This is essentially the same definition as in l’Huilier [1786]. Simon l’Huilier had written his Exposition
élémentaire des principes des calculs supérieurs to run for the Berlin Academy prize for the year 1786,
dedicated to the problem of finding a mathematical theory of the infinite. He won and it was published
as l’Huilier [1786].22 In it, l’Huilier sought to develop d’Alembert’s suggestion of founding the calculus
on the notion of limit. However, l’Huilier’s theory of limits is not much more than a rendering of the
Greek method of exhaustion into algebraic language. It is often rather tedious, because he distinguishes
between limits of variable quantities and limits of variable ratios and between limits in increase and limits
in decrease (variables are always monotonic23). It contains nevertheless a few “improvements,” like the
explicit statement that the limit must be a constant, followed by Stockler (in the classical definition of
limit in Diderot and d’Alembert [1751–1780], both the limit and the approaching magnitude are simply
“grandeurs”).
A greater influence from l’Huilier [1786] (which Stockler, in the foreword to Stockler [1794],
acknowledges having read) can be seen in the next two definitions, those of limit in increase (limite em
augmento) and limit in decrease (limite em deminuiçaõ). The latter is just a limit which is always larger
than the approaching variable and the former one that is always smaller. They are precisely l’Huilier’s
limite en grandeur and limite en petitesse. In l’Huilier [1786], they are exhaustive of all limits and it
seems that the same happens in Stockler [1794]. Both men assumed that all variables are monotonic.
22 Youschkevitch [1971] includes an account of the Berlin Academy competition and of l’Huilier [1786].
23 In a Latin edition, published in 1795, l’Huilier would acknowledge non-monotonic variables (see Youschkevitch [1971,
157]), but that was after the publication of Stockler’s Limit Theory.
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separately with the two cases, b “limite en grandeur” and b “limite en petitesse”), Stockler makes it
imperceptible, as we will see below. In fact, it seems to be there only to motivate the next two definitions,
those of variable without limit in increase (sem limite em augmento)
A variable quantity is said to be without limit in increase when it can increase in such a way that its magnitude eventually becomes
larger than any quantity one has assigned, no matter how large.
Huma quantidade variavel se diz sem limite em augmento, quando ella póde crescer de tal sorte, que a sua grandeza venha a ser
maior que qualquer quantidade, que se tenha assignado, por quaõ grande esta seja. [Stockler, 1794, 2]
and variable without limit in decrease (sem limite em deminuiçaõ)24
A variable quantity is said to be without limit in decrease when it can decrease in such a way that its magnitude eventually becomes
less than any quantity one has assigned, no matter how small.25
Huma quantidade variavel se diz sem limite em deminuiçaõ, quando ella póde deminuir de tal sorte, que a sua grandeza venha a
ser menor, que qualquer quantidade que se tenha assignado, por quão pequena esta seja. [Stockler, 1794, 3]
The latter was to reappear as Cauchy’s quantité infiniment petite. It also corresponds to Cunha’s
infinitesimal variable, and in fact even Rodrigues quotes these two last definitions as alternative to
Cunha’s infinite and infinitesimal, but requiring that one “regard each variable as one sole quantity that
changes its value by a continuous progression,” which he is unwilling to do [Rodrigues, 1999, 115].
Given this, one immediately expects that variables without limit in decrease will be central in Stockler’s
theory. They certainly are.
Section I of Stockler [1794] (26 theorems in 25 small pages—about modern size A6) consists of an
extensive arithmetic of variables without limit (mostly without limit in decrease), entirely based upon
epsilon–delta type arguments. It is, I believe, the most extensive and systematic use of this kind of
argument before the 19th century. It is not a mere algebraic transcription of the Method of Exhaustion,
as [l’Huilier, 1786] is. Theorem I is typical:
The sum of any quantities z, y, x, . . . each of which has no limit in decrease, has no limit in decrease.
Demonstration: Let n be the number of the variables z, y, x, &c., and k a quantity as small as one wishes. Take z < kn , y <
k
n ,
x < kn , and so on each of the other variables; we will have z+ y + x + · · ·< k. Q.E.D.
A somma de quaesquer quantidades variaveis z, y, x, . . . cada huma das quaes naõ tem limite em deminuiçaõ, também naõ tem
limite em deminuiçaõ.
Demonstraçaõ. Seja n o numero das variaveis z, y, x, &c., e k huma quantidade taõ pequena quanto se quizer. Tome-se z < kn ,
y < kn , x <
k
n , e assim successivamente cada huma das outras variaveis, e ficará z+ y + x + · · ·< k. C.S.Q.D. [Stockler, 1794, 3–4]
Notice how these variables decrease simultaneously.
A curiosity: Section I ends with theorems XXV and XXVI, to the effect that if x has no limit in
increase (XXV) or no limit in decrease (XXVI), then log x has no limit in increase. Stockler remarks
that these theorems might help understand modern geometers’ statements that the logarithm of infinity is
24 There is also a fleeting appearance of this in l’Huilier [1786, 21]: “soit x une quantité variable non-susceptible de limite en
petitesse (ou qui peut être rendue plus petite qu’aucune quantité assigné). . . .” It is nowhere near as important in l’Huilier as in
Stockler, but Stockler probably took his idea from this passage.
25 Stockler does not seem very comfortable about regarding zero as a quantity, which might explain why it cannot be a limit.
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positive from negative variables without limit in increase.
Section II (48 pages, 25 theorems) is devoted to quantities capable of limit. It uses largely the results
of Section I, through a Fundamental Principle:
If a variable quantity Z equals the sum or the difference between a constant quantity A and another variable quantity z which has no
limit in decrease, the constant quantity A will be (Def. III [that of limit]) the limit of the variable Z; thus, In every expression of this
form Z = A∓ z the expression for the limit of Z will be obtained by erasing z from the expression A∓ z; or, which is the same as
far as the said expression is concerned, supposing z= 0.
Se huma quantidade variavel Z for igual á somma, ou á differença de huma quantidade invariavel A, e de outra quantidade
variavel z, a qual naõ tenha limite em deminuiçaõ, a quantidade invariavel A será (Def. III) o limite da variavel Z; e por tanto Em
toda a expressaõ d’esta forma Z =A∓ z se terá a expressaõ do limite de Z, apagando z da expressaõ A∓ z; ou, o que he o mesmo
pelo que respeita á dita expressaõ, supondo z= 0. [Stockler, 1794, 28]
This is how, unlike l’Huilier, Stockler manages to make his proofs independent of the monotonicity
supposition, although he may not have been aware of this feature. As an example, let us see Theorem IX,
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b(b∓y ′) has no limit in decrease, as Theorem VI of Section I ascertains (b(b ∓ y′) has a limit and
ay′ ∓ bx′ has no limit in decrease), which concludes the proof.
A few mistakes do occur. The most serious one is in Theorem XXI (Section II), when Stockler tries to
prove that, x being without limit in decrease,
B = Lim.(B ±B ′x ±B ′′x2 ±B ′′′x3 ±B(4)x4 ±&c.)
(this is meant as an infinite series). He takes x to be smaller than an infinity of values that depend on
the B(i)’s, which of course is not possible in general; it is, however, the only place in which an epsilon–
delta argument is incorrect. Using that result, Stockler proves in Theorem XXII that “the limit of any
function Fx of a variable x capable of limit equals the same function of its limit”—in modern terms,
every function is continuous.
Section III is devoted to the circle and trigonometric functions and Section IV (the last one) to
developing some functions into power series. Both are much smaller than the first two.
6. Tristão Silveira: a failed conciliation
Tristão Álvares da Costa Silveira was a pupil of José Anastácio da Cunha at the Casa Pia, before
going to Coimbra to study mathematics. In 1795 he received his doctorate, and in 1801 he became
a professor at the University, after having taught calculus for two years at the Academia dos Guardas-
marinhas, in Lisbon. That same year he published the Lessons on Differential Calculus (Lições de
Calculo Differencial) that he had taught at the Academia. There he tried to combine Cunha’s ideas with
Stockler’s. Most naturally, he failed.
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have been much closer to Cunha: we do not know any reference to Silveira from Cunha, as we do to
Rodrigues (see Section 4.1).
For Silveira, d’Alembert’s metaphysics was the most appropriate for teaching the calculus [Silveira,
1801, II]. That is why he used limits in his Lessons. It is only natural that he used them in Stockler’s
version: limits in increase and limits in decrease, variables without limit either in increase or in decrease
and Stockler’s Fundamental Principle (see the previous section).
However, his admiration for Cunha led him to include several of his definitions, including those of
infinite and infinitesimal variables. But, for Silveira, variables are quantities, not expressions, so that he
can easily say that an infinitesimal quantity is the same thing that a variable without limit in decrease
[Silveira, 1801, 3].
Silveira also copies Cunha’s Proposition I of Book XV and his demonstration (see above, at the end
of Section 4.3). Regrettably, he interprets it as being about infinite series, not about polynomials (recall
that the demonstration uses the number n of coefficients). While Cunha used it to compute the fluxion
of a polynomial, Silveira uses it to differentiate any function: given an arbitrary function Φ of x, and
expanding %(Φx)
%x
as A+B%x +C%x2 +D%x3 + etc., he concludes that B%x +C%x2 +D%x3 + etc.
is infinitesimal, provided that %x is infinitesimal, so that A= lim %(Φx)
%x
.
It is a pity, but we must conclude that Silveira was not capable of understanding Cunha’s view of the
calculus.
7. A few final remarks
Cunha and Stockler had many sources in common, namely Newton and d’Alembert, and it is not
a coincidence that both used Newtonian terminology when writing on the calculus or that both rejected
the actual infinite and the Leibnizian tradition (remember that the adopted textbook at the University of
Coimbra was the Leibnizian [Bezout, 1774]). It may have been these common aspects that led both to
use epsilon–delta arguments. However, unlike Stockler, Cunha had a very original view of the calculus,
and the differences between them are useful to show us how original he was.
Stockler represents, in a way, the peak of d’Alembert’s metaphysics of the calculus. His Limit Theory
is possibly the fullest development of the limit concept before Cauchy’s revolution in the 1820s. It shows
how far an average mathematician could go on the path that d’Alembert had suggested.
Cunha is useful to show how a nondynamic concept of variable might prevent a mathematician from
adhering to a limit-based calculus. This might also show how something similar to modern calculus might
have developed from grounds different from the limit tradition.
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